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Abstract
We analyze, in this paper, DSNK general equilibrium model with indi-
visible labor where rms may belong to two di¤erent nal goods producing
sectors: one where wages and employment are determined in competitive
labor markets and the orther where wages and employment are the re-
sult of a contractual process between unions and rms. The presence of
monopoly unions introduces real wage rigidity in the model and this im-
plies a trade-o¤ between output stabilization and ination stabilization
i.e., as in Blanchard and Galì (2005), the so called divine coincidence
does not hold. We show that the negative e¤ect of a productivity shock
on ination and the positive e¤ect of a cost-push shock is crucially deter-
mined by the proportion of rms that belong to the competitive sector.
The larger is this number, the smaller are these e¤ects. We derive a wel-
fare based objective function as a second order Taylor approximation of
the expected utility of the economys representative agent and we analyze
optimal monetary policy under discretion and under constrained commit-
ment. We show that the larger is the number of rms that belong to
the competitive sector, the smaller should be the response of the nominal
interest rate to exogenous productivity and cost-push shocks. If we con-
sider, however, an instrument rule where the interest rate must react to
inationary expectations, the rule is not a¤ected by the structure of the
labor market. The results of the model are consistent with a well known
empirical regularity in macroeconomics, i.e. that employment volatility is
larger than real wage volatility.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 02 72342696. E-mail Adress: lorenza.rossi@unicatt.it
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1 Introduction
One important di¤erence between the U.S. and the European labor markets, is
the role that trade unions play in determining wages and employment. While in
the U.S., in the year 2002, only about 15% of workers were covered by collective
contract agreements1 , in countries such as France, Italy or Sweden the percent-
age of workers covered by collective contracts was above 84%.2 This is by no
means the only di¤erence between the labor markets on the two sides of the At-
lantic, since European economies have also other sources of rigidity like higher
employment protection and greater unemployment benets3 ; but nevertheless is
a very striking di¤erence which, in our opinion, deserves careful consideration,
especially if one tries to derive policy prescriptions. What are the consequences
of the di¤erent weight of trade unions for monetary policy? How should the Fed
and the ECB behave in response to exogenous, persistent shocks? Should these
two central banks follow di¤erent policy rules?
In order to answer these important questions we propose, in this paper, a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New Keynesian (DSGE-NK) model
where rms may belong to two di¤erent nal-goods producing sectors: one
where wages and employment are determined in a competitive labor market and
the other where wages and employment are the result of a contractual process
between unions and rms. In order to evaluate movements of labor along the
extensive margin, we assume, as in Hansen [22] and Rogerson and Wright [31],
that labor supply is indivisible and that workers face a positive probability to
remain unemployed; as in Ma¤ezzoli [25], we assume that unions set wages
according to the popular monopoly-union model introduced by Dunlop [12] and
Oswald [28]. By doing this we depart, in this paper, from the recent literature,
that has recently tried to improve on the standardDNK model by considering
explicitly the role of labor market frictions for monetary policy. While these
papers, among which we nd Chéron and Langot [7], Walsh [35] [36], Trigari [33],
[34], Moyen and Sahuc [27] and Andres et al. [2] and, more recentlyby Christo¤el
and Linzert [9] and Blanchard and Galì [4] [5], analyze monetary policy in
search and matching models of the labor market à la Mortensen-Pissarides ([26]),
we chose to introduce unemployment in the simpler Rogerson and Wright [31]
framework and to concentrate on the fact that collective bargaining between
unions and rms may give rise to real wage rigidity.4
1The concept of union coverage, i.e. workers covered by collective contracts as a percentage
of total employment is a better indicator of the role of trade unions than the concept of union
density, i.e. the percentage of workers that belong to a union. This is because in many
countries collective contracts signed by unions and representative of rms are binding also for
non-members.
2More precisely, the number of persons covered by collective agreeements over total em-
ployment was 94.5% in France in 2003, 84.1% in Italy in the year 2000 and 85.1% in Sweden
in the year 2000. For a complete set of data on union coverage on the various countries see
Lawrence and Ishikawa [24].
3Also these characteristics of the European labor markets can be probably be reconduced
to the crucial role that trade unions play in the social structure of European countries.
4Also Christo¤el and Linzert [9] and Blanchard and Galì [4] [5] consider explicitly real
wage rigidity, but in their models real wage rigidity is simply assumed and it is not derived
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The fact that monopoly unions tend to keep real wage rigid, allows us to
consider an economy composed of two sectors: one where real wages do not
adjust in response to productivity shocks and one where real wages adjust; the
relative weight of the unionized and competitive sectors can be taken as a mea-
sure of the extent of real wage rigidity in the economy. As was recently shown
by Blanchard and Galì [4], real wage rigidity has a very important consequence
for monetary policy since in this case what Blanchard and Galì dene as the
divine coincidencedoes not generally hold : for a central bank stabilizing out-
put around the level that would prevail under exible prices (natural output) is
not equivalent to pursuing the e¢ cient level of output, in which case a trade-o¤
between ination stabilization and output gap stabilization arises. The reason
is simple: a productivity slowdown, i.e. a negative productivity shock, tends
to lower e¢ cient output but, since in the unionized sector real wages remain
constant, the natural level of output that would prevail under price exibility
decreases even more, so that the di¤erence between e¢ cient output and nat-
ural output increases. In sticky price models ination depends on marginal
costs and, in turn, marginal costs depend on the di¤erence between natural
output and actual output; as a consequence a Phillips curve, correctly dened
as depending on the gap between e¢ cient output and actual output, will de-
pend on productivity shocks. A central bank that tries to fully accommodate a
negative productivity shock will have to accept higher ination.
One important result of our model is that the trade-o¤ between ination
stabilization and output stabilization that arises endogenously in the economy
is signicantly a¤ected by the relative weight of the unionized and the com-
petitive sectors: the large is the fraction of rms that are able to set wages in
a competitive labor market, the smaller is the trade-o¤ they face in response
to productivity shocks. This has signicant consequences for optimal monetary
policy, that in our model is derived, as in Woodford [37], from the maximization
by the central bank of a second order approximation of agentsutility function.
In an economy where unions are not very important the nominal interest rate
should change much less in response to a productivity shock than in an economy
where wages are largely set by collective bargaining between unions and rms.
The larger is the fraction of rms that set wages in competitive labor markets,
the smaller is the e¤ect of productivity shocks on ination, and therefore the
smaller the need to increase interest rates to prevent an increase in the rate of
ination.
If we turn however to an istrument rule for monetary policy, i.e. to an
interest rate rule dened in terms of ination and the rate of interest that
supports the e¢ cient allocation, we nd that the structure of labor markets
should not inuence the response of the nominal interest rate to inationary
expectations. In general the Taylor principle will apply, i.e. nominal interest
rate should increase more than proportionately with respect to ination, but
the type of response will not be a¤ected the fraction of rms that set wages
in a competitive labor markets. Therefore, if we consider two countries hit
as a consequences of the institutional structure that characterizes the labor market.
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by the same shocks and where the central bank behaves optimally, we will
observe that in the country where the number of walrasian rms is larger
the interest rate will vary much less than in the other country. This, however,
will not be the consequences of di¤erences in the reaction of the two central
banks to a unit change in expected ination; rather it will be caused by the fact
that the economy where labor markets are more competitive will experience
smaller inationary tensions. It is interesting to observe that, if one looks at
the monetary policy of the Fed and of the ECB from January 1999 (when the
ECB started to operate) we nd a much larger variability of the policy rate in
the U.S. than in the Euro area; according to our model, this seems to indicate
that either the two areas were not hit by similar shocks, or the two Central
banks did not behave optimally.
Besides analyzing the response of the economy to productivity shock, our
model provides also a convenient framework to address important normative
issues such as, for example, the optimal behavior of central banks in periods
characterized by labor market turmoil and exogenous wage shocks. In the
framework we propose here, in fact, a policy trade-o¤ for the central bank arises
also in response to exogenous changes in the unions reservation wage, that
we interpret as cost push shocks. If the unions reservation wage is subject
to exogenous changes, and these changes tend to be persistent over time, then
a welfare maximizing central bank must again face the problem of whether
to accommodate these shocks with a easier monetary policy. As in the case of
technology shocks, also in this case optimal monetary policy requires only partial
accommodation and the response of the central bank is crucially determined
by the fraction of rms that, in the economy, set wages in competitive labor
markets.
One last, important result is that the model is able to account for a well
known stylized fact in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth behavior of
wages and the relatively volatile behavior of unemployment over the business
cycle. When the level of unemployment that the economy achieves under an
optimal discretionary policy is written as a function of the relevant shocks, an
exogenous wage shock will in general induce a movement both in the real wage
and in the rate of unemployment; a productivity shock, instead, will induce a
movement in the rate of unemployment, but not in the real wage. An economy
frequently hit by exogenous changes in technology will show, therefore, a strong
variability in the rate of unemployment without experiencing, at the same time,
signicant movements in the real wage.5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by introducing
indivisible labor in a DNK model. In Section 3 we develop the two-sectors labor
market model. In Section 4 we study optimal monetary policy and, nally, in
Section 4 we calibrate the model under the optimal rule and some simpler policy
rules.
5Also Gertler and Trigari [19] propose a model where wages and unemployment move con-
sistently with the observed data. They achieve this result, however, by introducing exogenous
multiperiod wage contracts.
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2 A model with indivisible labor
2.1 The Representative Household
We consider an economy populated by many identical, innitely lived worker-
households each of measure zero. Households demand a Dixit, Stiglitz [11]
composite consumption bundle produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms. In each period households sell labor services to the rms
and each rm is endowed with a pool of households from which it can hire. As
a matter of fact rms hire workers from a pool composed of innitely many
households so that the individual household member is again of measure zero.
Since each household supplies its labor only to one rm, which can be clearly
identied, workers try to extract some producer surplus by organizing them-
selves into a rm specic trade unions. As organizing in a union is costly, we
assume that workers, each time, succeed in organizing in a union only in 1  q
rms, while in the remaining q rms they do not succeed and labor markets
remain competitive. Given the structure of the economy, q not only represents
the number of rms that face a walrasian labor market but also the probability
that a worker is assigned to the walrasian sector. Once a household is assigned
to a rm specic sector, as in Hansen [22], Rogerson [31] and Rogerson and
Wright [32], it has the alternative between working a xed number of hours and
not working at all. For the sake of simplicity we assume that q is constant.
Let us rst consider the problem of an agent that supplies his labor to a
rm in the walrasian sector, i.e. to a rm that faces a competitive labor market
where rms and workers act as a price taker. We assume that households enter
employment lotteries, i.e. sign with a rm a contract that commits them to work
a xed number of hours, that we normalize to one, with probability Nwt : Since
all households are identical, they will all choose the same contract, i.e. the same
Nwt : However, although households are ex-ante identical, they will di¤er ex-
post depending on the outcome of the lottery: a fraction Nwt of the continuum
of households will work and the rest 1   Nwt will remain unemployed. The
allocation of individuals to work or leisure is determined completely at random
by a lottery, and lottery outcomes are independent over time. Before the lottery
draw, the expected intratemporal utility function is:
Nwt

Cw0;t (0)
1 
+ (1 Nwt )

Cw1;t (1)
1 
(1)
where Cw0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals. We denote by  ()
the utility of leisure. Since the utility of leisure of employed individuals  (0)
and the utility of leisure of unemployed individuals  (1) are positive constants,
we assume  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1: As in King and Rebelo6 [21], we assume
0 < 1:
Since they face a probability 1 Nwt of not working at all, workers will try
to acquire insurance against the risk of remaining unemployed. We assume that
6This depends on the fact that the utility of leisure  (1 Nt) as usual, is an increasing
function of the time spend in leisure. Given that the time spend in leisure is greater for
unemployed agent than for employed agent this means that  (1) >  (0) :
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asset markets are complete, so that employed and unemployed individuals are
able to achieve perfect risk sharing, equating the marginal utility of consuption
accross states.
Let us now consider the case of a household that works in a unionized
labor market. The unionized sector is populated by decentralized trade unions,
so that each intermediate goods-producing rm negotiate with a single union
i 2 (0; 1) ; which is too small to inuence the outcome of the market. Unions
negotiate the wage on behalf of their members. Once the wage rate is dened,
rms chose the amount of labor that maximize their prots. Similarly to what
happens in the competitive case, labor is indivisible and workers participate
to employment lotteries. As in the previous case, therefore, before the lottery
draw, the expected intratemporal utility function of workers, who happens to
belong to the unionized sector is
Nut

Cu0;t (0)
1 
+ (1 Nut )

Cu1;t (1)
1 
(2)
where Cu0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals. Again, we assume
 (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1:
Since they face a positive probability of being unemployed, risk averse work-
ers will try to obtain insurance against the risk of being unemployed; access to
complete asset markets will allow individuals to achieve perfect risk sharing. It
is important to observe that, beside the risk of remaining unemployed, workers
in this model face also another type of uncertainty since they do not know,
a priori, whether they will participate to a competitive labor market or to a
unionized one. We assume that, through complete asset markets, agents can
also acquire insurance against the income uctuations implied by this type of
uncertainty. Recalling that q is the probability of belonging to the walrasian
sector and 1 q is the probability of belonging to the unionized sector, before the
lotteries are drawn and before learning in what sector they will happen to work,
given (1) and (2) the expected intratemporal utility function of an household is:
1
1  
(
qNwt

Cw0;t0
1 
+ q(1 Nwt )

Cw1;t1
1 
+
+(1  q)Nut

Cu0;t0
1 
+ (1  q)(1 Nut )

Cu1;t1
1 
)
(3)
Perfect risk sharing implies,
(Cw0;t)
  (0)1  = (Cw1;t)
  (1)1 
(Cu0;t)
  (0)1  = (Cu1;t)
  (1)1 
(4)
(Cw0;t)
  (0)1  = (Cu0;t)
  (0)1 
(Cw1;t)
  (1)1  = (Cu1;t)
  (1)1 
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which imply
Cu0;t = C
w
0;t = C0;t
(5)
Cu1;t = C
w
1;t = C1;t
As we show in Appendix 1, this allows us to write the life-time expected in-
tertemporal utility function of a representative household as:
Ut = Et
1X
=t
 t
1
1   [Ct (Nt)]
1 
; (6)
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount rate and where
Nt = qN
w
t + (1  q)Nut (7)
is the probability to be employed.
The ow budget constraint of the representative household is given by:
PtCt + P
 1
t Bt+1  qWwt Nwt + (1  q)Wut Nut +Bt +t   Tt (8)
where Wht ; h = w; u is the wage rate in the two sectors, and
Pt = (P
w
t )
q
(Put )
1 q (9)
is the corresponding consumption price index (CPI) obtained7 as in the standard
setup, as the price that minimizes total consumption expenditure subject to
Ct = 1: The purchase of consumption goods, Ct; is nanced by labor income,
prot income t; and a lump-sum transfers Tt from the Government. We assume
that agents can also have access to a nancial market where nominal bonds are
exchanged. We denote by Bt+1 the holdings of a nominal bond carried over
from period t that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1. In solving the
maximization of (6) subject to (8) we should remember that the worker chooses
the levels of consumption Ct and Ct+1 and the supply of labor Nwt , while N
u
t
is taken as given, as it is determined by the union together with the rm. The
rst order conditions imply,
1 = RtEt
"
Ct+1
Ct
  
 (Nt)
 (Nt+1)
1 
Pt
Pt+1
#
(10)
Wwt
Pt
=  CtNw (Nt)
 (Nt)
=  CtqN (Nt)
 (Nt)
(11)
where equation (10) is the standard consumption Euler equation. Equation (11)
holds only for households employed in the walrasian sector.
7This is derived in appendix A2.
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For households hired by rms in the Unionized sector, Unions negotiate the
wage on behalf of their members. In particular, we consider a version of the
well-known monopoly union model introduced by Dunlop [12] and Oswald [28].
The union chooses the nominal wage rate that maximizes the following welfare
function8 :
Nt (i)
Wut
Pt
+ (1 Nt (i)) W
r
t
Pt
(12)
subject to the labor demand of the unionized sector. W rt is the reservation
wage, which can be broadly interpreted as the disutility of labor as perceived
by the union and represents both the value union members assign to leisure
and any unemployment subsidy granted by the government. With equation
(12) we assume that unions are risk neutral and maximize members average
wage. We assume that the reservation wage, which represents the disutility of
employment perceived by the unions, follows a stochastic process. Denoting by
wrt the logarithm of W
r
t we assume that:
wrt = ww
r
t 1 + w^
r
t (13)
where w < 1 and w
r
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation w.
The employment rate and the wage rate are determined in a non-cooperative
dynamic game between the unions and the rms. We restrict the attention to
Markov strategies, so that in each period unions and rms solve a sequence of
independent static games. Each union behaves as a Stackelberg leader and each
rm as a Stackelberg follower. Once the wage has been chosen, each rm decides
the employment rate along its labor demand function. Even if unions are large
at the rm level, they are small at the economy level, and therefore they take
the aggregate wage as given. The ex-ante probability of being employed is equal
to the aggregate employment rate and the allocation of union members to work
or leisure is completely random and independent over time.
From the rst order conditions of the unions maximization problem with
respect to Wt (i) we have:
Wut (i)
Pt
=
1

W rt
Pt
: (14)
Since 1 > 1; this implies that the real wage rate is set always above the reser-
vation wage.
Finally we assume that total consumption is a geometric average of con-
sumption of the total consumption of the walrasian good, Cw;t; and of total
consumption of the Unionized good Cu;t. Then,
Ct =
(Cw;t)
q
(Cu;t)
1 q
qq (1  q)1 q : (15)
8A complete discussion of the problem of dening a unions objective function can be found
in Farber [13]. In assuming this utility function we follow Ma¤ezzoli [25]. The utility function
above correspondes to the risk neutral analogue of the utilitarian utility function of Oswald
[28]. Anderson and Deverux ([1]) and Pissarides ([29]) use a similar utility function.
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2.2 The Two Representative Final Goods-Producing Firms
We begin describing the production of nal goods. In each sector (h = w; u)
a perfectly competitive nal good producer purchases a Y ht (j) units of each
intermediate good j 2 [0; 1] at a nominal price Pht (j) to produce Y ht units of
the nal good (labeled as w and u) with the following constant returns to scale
technology:
Y wt =
Z q
0
1
q
Y wt (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
and Y ut =
Z 1
q
1
1  q Y
u
t (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(16)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods, which
is equal across the two sector. Prot maximization yields the following set of
demands for intermediate goods:
Y wt (j) =

Pwt (j)
Pwt
 
Y wt and Y
u
t (j) =

Put (j)
Put
 
Y ut (17)
for all i: In Appendix A2 we show that
Pwt =
Z q
0
1
q
Pwt (j)
1 
dj
 1
1 
and Put =
Z 1
q
1
1  qP
u
t (j)
1 
dj
 1
1 
:
(18)
is the price indexes of the walrasian and unionized sectors.
2.3 The Two Representative Intermediate Goods-Producing
Firms
We abstract from capital accumulation and assume that representative inter-
mediate good-producing rm j in sector h; hires Nht units of labor from the
household and produce Y ht (j) units of the intermediate good using the follow-
ing technology:
Y ht (j) = AtN
h
t (j)
 (19)
where At is an exogenous productivity shock common to all rms. We assume
that the lnAt  at follows the autoregressive process
at = aat 1 + a^t (20)
where a < 1 and a^t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation a.
Before choosing the price of its goods, a rm chooses the level of Nht (j)
which minimizes its total costs, solving the following standard costs minimiza-
tion problem:
min
fNtg
TCt =
 
1  h Wht
Pht
Nht (j) (21)
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subject to (19), where h represents an employment subsidy to the sector h rm,
which is set such that the steady state equilibrium in both sectors coincides with
the e¢ cient one. The rst order condition with respect to Nht (j) is given by: 
1  h Wht (j)
Pht (j)
=
MCn;ht (j)
Pht (j)

Y ht (j)
Nht (j)
; (22)
where MCn;ht (j) represents the nominal marginal costs of rm j in sector
h while MCht (j) represents rms j real marginal costs. Dening sector h
aggregate real marginal costs as:
MCht 
MCn;ht
Pht
=
 
1  h

Wht
Pht
Nht
Y ht
(23)
equation (22) implies,
MCht =
MCn;ht (j)
Pht (j)
Y ht (j)
Nht (j)
Nht
Y ht
: (24)
2.4 Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that the production of the nal good
be allocated to expenditure, as follows:
Y ht (j) = Ch;t (j) h = w; u (25)
where Ch;t is the total consumption of the good produced by sector h: The
market clearing condition for the two nal consumption goods output therefore
are given by:
Y wt =
Z q
0
1
q
Cw;t (j) dj and Y ut =
Z 1
q
1
1  qCw;t (j) dj (26)
considering (16) then
Yt = Ct (27)
which represents the aggregate economys resource constraint. Dening by X
the steady state value of a generic variable Xt and by xt = lnXt   lnX the
log-deviation of the variable from its steady state value, then a linear rst order
approximation of the resource constrained around the steady state is given by:
yt = ct (28)
Since the net supply of bonds, in equilibrium is zero, equilibrium in the bonds
market, instead, implies
Bt = 0: (29)
Labor market clearing implies
Nwt =
Z q
0
Nt (j)
w
dj and Nut =
Z 1
q
Nt (j)
u
dj (30)
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which implies
Nt  Nwt +Nut =
Z 1
0
Nt (j) dj: (31)
From equations (17) and (19) we have
Dwt Y
w
t = At (N
w
t )
 and Dut Y
u
t = At (N
u
t )
 (32)
where
Dwt =
"Z q
0
1
q

Pwt (j)
Pwt
  
dj
#
and Dut =
"Z 1
q
1
1  q

Put (j)
Put
  
dj
#
(33)
are measures of price dispersion. Given the market clearing conditions and given
equation (15) we have that,
Yt =

Y wt
q
q 
Y ut
1  q
1 q
(34)
the total amount of goods produced by the economy is a geometric average of
the aggregate production of the two sectors. Given that in a neighborhood of
a symmetric equilibrium and up to a rst order approximation Dht ' 1, log-
linearizing equation (32) and (34) we obtain
ywt = at + n
w
t and y
u
t = at + n
u
t (35)
The log-linearization of (34) yealds,
yt = qy
w
t + (1  q) yut (36)
while the log-linearization of (31) implies
nt = qn
w
t + (1  q)nut (37)
Considering now equations (35), (36) and (37) we nd the log-linearized aggre-
gate output which is given by
yt = at + nt: (38)
2.5 The Two Sectors Labor Market Equilibrium
2.5.1 The Walrasian Sector
Multiplying both sides of the walrasian sector labor demand (23) multiplied
by P
w
t
Pt
and considering the consumers labor supply, (11), equilibrium in the
walrasian labor market is given by:
 CtNw (Nt)
 (Nt)
=MCwt
Pwt
Pt

(1  w)
Y wt
Nwt
(39)
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From the household intertemporal problem (derived in the technical appendix
A4) we have that Pwt Cw;t = qPtCt , since the market clearing condition implies
Cw;t = Y
w
t ; then
 Nw (N
w
t ; N
u
t )
 (Nwt ; N
u
t )
Nwt =
q
(1  w)MC
w
t : (40)
2.5.2 The Unionized Sector
Considering the wage schedule (12) and the labor demand (23), labor market
equilibrium in the unionized sector is given by:
1

W rt
Pt
=MCut
Put
Pt

(1  u)
Y ut
Nut
(41)
which, given the denition of the aggregate price index, can be rewritten
1

W rt
Pt
=MCut

Put
Pwt
q

(1  u)
Y ut
Nut
: (42)
Notice that, di¤erently from what happens in the walrasian sector, equation
(42) contains the relative price between goods produced in the walrasian and in
the unionized sector. In the walrasian labor market relative price does not a¤ect
equilibrium, since movements in the relative price are corrected by movements
in relative wage. In the unionized sector instead, because of real wage rigidity,
a change in relative prices has a signicant e¤ect on equilibrium. Since from
the intertemporal household problem we have that Put Cu;t = (1  q)CtPt and
considering market clearing conditions, we have that,
1

W rt
Pt
=

(1  w)MC
u
t

1  q
q
q
(Y wt )
q
(Y ut )
1 q 1
Nut
(43)
2.6 The First Best Level of Output
The e¢ cient level of output can be obtained by solving the problem of a benev-
olent planner that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the representative
household, subject to the resource constraint and the production function. This
problem is analyzed in the Appendix, where we show that the e¢ cient supply
of labor, in our economy, is given by:
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
Nt =  : (44)
Log-linearizing (44), and considering the economy aggregate production func-
tion, we obtain9
yEfft = at: (45)
9See appendix A?.
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2.7 The Flexible Price Equilibrium Output in the Wal-
rasian Sector
Under exible prices, all rms set their price equal to a constant markup over
marginal cost. Assuming that rms mark-up, Pt is constant, under the exible
price-equilibrium rms real marginal costs are costant at their steady state level
and therefore are given by:
MCwt =
1
1 + P
: (46)
Considering now the log-linearization of (40) we obtain10 ,
mcwt =
1

ywt  
    (   1)

at   (   1)

yt (47)
Notice that real marginal costs in the walrasian sector are increasing in the
output of the walrasian sector decreasing in the aggregate output. Considering
that mcwt = 0, from the aggregate production function we have that under the
exible price equilibrium:
ywft =
    (   1)

at +
 (   1)

yt; (48)
exible price equilibrium output in the walrasian sector is increasing in the
productivity shock and aggregate output. Notice that when q = 1; (48) can be
rewritten as ywft = at; i.e., the exible price equilibrium output coincides with
the e¢ cient one.
Given equations (47) and (48), real marginal costs can be rewritten in terms
of the gap between actual output and its natural level, as follows:
mcwt =
1


ywt   ywft

: (49)
2.8 The Flexible Price Equilibrium Output in the Union-
ized sector
Also in the unionized sector when prices are exible all rms set their prices as
a constant markup over marginal costs, given by (46). The log-linearizzation of
(43) implies:
mcut =
1

yut   yt  
1

at + w
r
t ; (50)
As in the walrasian sector real marginal costs are increasing in the output of the
unionized sector and decreasing in the aggregate output. When mcut = 0 then
yuft = yt + at   wrt ; (51)
10See appendix A?
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which implies that exible price equilibrium output in the unionized sector is
increasing in the productivity shock and aggregate output. Notice that when
q = 0; (48) can be rewritten as yuft =
1
1 at   1 wrt .
Given equations (50) and (51), real marginal costs can be rewritten in terms
of the gap between actual output and its natural level, as follows:
mcut =
1


yut   yuft

: (52)
2.9 The Aggregate Flexible Price Equilibrium Output
Since the aggregate exible price equilibrium output is the weighted sum of
equations (48) and (51), we obtain,
yft =
   q (   1)
 (1  ) + qat  
 (1  q)
 (1  ) + qw
r
t : (53)
Given (45), the output gap with respect to the e¢ cient equilibrium output is
given by:
yft   yEfft =
 (1  q)
 (1  ) + qat  
 (1  q)
 (1  ) + qw
r
t : (54)
What is important to notice, here, is that, unlike what happens in the walrasian
model, the di¤erence between exible equilibrium output (natural output) and
the e¢ cient equilibrium output is not constant, but is a function of the relevant
shocks that hit the economy. In this model therefore, as in Blanchard and
Galì [4] stabilizing the output gap - the di¤erence between actual and natural
output - is not equivalent to stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap - the
gap between actual and e¢ cient output. In other words, what Blanchard and
Galì call the divine coincidencewill not hold, since any policy that brings the
economy to its natural level is not necessarily an optimal policy.
Dening by  = (1 q)(1 )+q the response of the welfare relevant output gap
to the relevant shocks (notice that the response of to a technology shock is
identical, but with the oppposit sign, to the response to a cost push shock), we
immediately observe that
d
dq
< 0: (55)
As the number of walrasian rms increases, the di¤erence between natural out-
put and e¢ cient output decreases, i.e. natural output tends to e¢ cient output.
The reason is quite intuitive: the smaller is the population of unionized rms
the smaller is the importance of real wage rigidity in the economy and the
technology and cost push shocks become less and less relevant.
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2.10 The Aggregate Phillips Curve
Each intermediate good-producing rm has a monopolistic power in the pro-
duction of its own variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In
particular, rms choose Pht (j) in a staggered price setting à la Calvo-Yun [6]
with a decreasing return to scale production function. As shown in the appendix
A6, the solution of the rms problem in this case is given by:
ht = Et
h
t+1 + mc
h
t (56)
where  =
(1  )(1  )
 

+(1 ) and  is the probability with which rms reset
prices. Given equations (49) and (50), the sector specic Phillips curves in the
walrasian and unionized sectors are
wt = Et
w
t+1 + a
1


ywt   ywft

(57)
n
ut = Et
u
t+1 + a
1


yut   yuft

(58)
where ywft and y
uf
t are dened as in (48) and (51). Since t = q
w
t +(1  q)ut ;
the Phillips curve for the aggregate equation can be written as
t = Ett+1 + a
1


yt   yft

: (59)
It is important to notice, at this point, that the output gap that is contained in
equation (59) is not the relevant output gap. What is relevant, for an optimizing
central bank, is not to miminze the distance between actual and natural (exible
price equilibrium) output, but rather the distance between actual and e¢ cient
output. If we now express the policy relevant output gap as xt = yt   yefft and
we substitute (54), (59) can be rewritten as
t = Ett+1 + a
1

xt   aat + awrt : (60)
where  = (1 q)(1 )+q : From equation (??) is quite clear that, for a central bank,
achieving xt = 0 does not imply otaining t = 0: We have therefore:
Result 1. In a two sector labor market economy, because of the presence
of unions, the divine coincidence does not hold, i.e., stabilizing ination is
not equivalent to stabilizing the output gap dened as the deviation of output
from e¢ cient output. A negative (positive) productivity shock has a positive
(negative) e¤ect on ination, while a cost push shock has an e¤ect of the same
size but with the opposite sign on ination.
This result depends on the existence of a real distortion in the economy,
beside the one induced by monopolistic competition, and the nominal distor-
tion caused by rmsstaggered price setting. When a productivity shock hits
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the economy, e¢ cient output, given by equation (45), increases by the same
amount. Natural output instead (i.e., the level of output that would prevail
in a exible price equilibrium) increases more than proportionally so that the
di¤erence between e¢ cient output and natural output decreases. This is due to
the fact that in a unionized sector, following a productivity shock, real wages
remain constant and therefore do not o¤set the e¤ects of the shock on real
marginal cost. Therefore, the natural level of output di¤ers from the e¢ cient
level and this di¤erence is not constant. As it is evident from equation (63), if
the Central Bank stabilizes output around the e¢ cient level, ination will be
completely vulnerable to productivity and cost-push shocks; in other words the
output gap is no longer a su¢ cient statistics for the e¤ect of real activity on
ination.
Given (55), we immediately observe that the response of ination to the
technology and the exogenous wage shocks decreases as the fraction of walrasian
rms in the market increases. We can therefore state,
Result 2. The response of ination to a negative productivity shock and to
a positive reservation wage shock decreases as the number q of walrasian rms
increases.
Another interesting aspect of this model is that we are able to express the
Phillips curve in its more traditional form, i.e. in terms of unemployment. From
equations (38), (45) and (54) we obtain in fact that
nt =
xt

(61)
Expressing the rate of unemployment as Ut = 1   Nt and log linearizing
around the steady state we obtain
ut =   

xt; (62)
where  = N1 N : We can therefore rewrite the Philllips curve as
t = Ett+1   a

ut   a  (1  q)
 (1  ) + qat + a
 (1  q)
 (1  ) + qw
r
t : (63)
The relationship between unemployment and the output gap allows us to con-
sider, indi¤erently, the output gap and the unemployment rate as policy objec-
tives for the central bank.
2.11 The Aggregate IS-Curve
In order to obtain the IS curve we start by log-linearizing around the steady
state the Euler equation (10). Considering that in steady state the optimal
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subsidy setting implies N (N)N(N) =  ; the log-linearized Euler equation is given
by:
ct = Et fct+1g+  (1  )

Et fnt+1g   1

(r^t   Et ft+1g) : (64)
with r^t = rt  %; where rt = lnRt and % =   ln which is the steady state
interest rate all the variables without a subscript are taken at their steady state
levels. Given the economy resource constraint (28) and the production function
(38), the Euler equation (64) can be written as:
yt = Et fyt+1g   (1  )Et fat+1g   (rt   Et ft+1g) (65)
which represents the IS equation of our simple economy.
Let us dene, the relevant output gap as the di¤erence between actual output
and e¢ cient output, i.e.,
xt = yt   yEfft : (66)
In this case the IS equation can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as,
xt = Et fxt+1g   (rt   Et ft+1g   ret ) : (67)
where r^et is the rate of interest that supports the e¢ cient allocation, which can
be expressed as:
r^et = Et fat+1g = Et
n
yEfft+1
o
=   (1  a) at: (68)
Note that (67) expressed in terms of the gap between the actual and the e¢ cient
output relates the output gap to current and anticipated deviations of the real
interest rate from its e¢ cient counterpart.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy
In the appendix A7 we show that also for the non-separable preferences assumed
in our framework, consumersutility can be approximated up to the second order
by a quadratic equation of the kind:
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY;t
2
Et
1X
t=0

2t+k +
a

x2t+k

+

kk3

(69)
where ~Ut+k = Ut+k   Ut+k is the deviation of consumersutility from the level
achievable in the frictionless equilibrium, and  is the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods, which are used as input in the nal good sector.
Notice that, the relative weights assigned to ination and to the output gap are
linked to the structural parameters reecting preferences and technology.
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3.1 Discretion
If the Central Bank cannot credibly commit in advance to a future policy action
or a sequence of future policy actions, then the optimal monetary policy is
discretionary, in the sense that the policy makers choose in each period the
value to assign to the policy instrument, that here we assume to be the short-
term nominal interest rate r^t. In order to do so, the Central Bank maximizes the
welfare-based loss function (69), subject to the economy Phillips curve, taking
all expectations as given. Therefore, the Central Bank chooses the level of
ination and output gap that maximize:
~Wt =  UY;t
2

2t +
a

x2t

+Ht (70)
subject to (63)
where Ht =  UY;t2 Et
1X
t=1
h

a
2t+k +
1
x
2
t+k
i
.
The rst order conditions imply:
xt =  

t: (71)
Substituting into (63) we obtain:
t =
1


(Ett+1   aat + awrt ) (72)
where 
 = 1 + a 2 : and  =
(1 q)
(1 )+q
Iterating forward (72),
t =  a


Et
1X
i=0




i  
at+i   wrt+i

(73)
and
Ett+1 =  a


Et
1X
i=0




i  
at+i+1   wrt+i+1

: (74)
Given that, Et fat+i+1g = iaat; and that Et

wrt+i+1
	
= iww
r
t , (73) and (74)
can be rewritten as,
t =   a

  a
at +
a

  w
wrt (75)
Ett+1 =   aa

  a
at +
aw

  w
wrt (76)
Notice that we can express current ination as a function of the relevant shocks
at and wrt . A positive productivity shock requires a decrease in ination and a
positive cost push shock requires an increase in ination. Because of rational
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expectations we have a similar result for expected ination. Given equation
(72) and (75) we can write the expression of output gap as a function of the
exogenous shocks, which is given by
xt =
a
 (
  a)
at   a
 (
  a)
wrt (77)
Using (75), (76) and (68) we can also rewrite expected ination as:
Ett+1 = wt +
(a   w)
 (1  a)
a

  a
r^nt (78)
The optimal level of ination can be implemented by the Central Bank by setting
the nominal interest rate. The interest rate rule can be obtained by substituting
(71), (75) and (76) into the IS curve (67), in which case we obtain:
r^t =  

1 +

1  a
a




aa

  a

+  (1  a)

at+
+

1 +

1  w
w




aw

  w

wrt (79)
We can therefore state
Result 3. Under discretion an optimal monetary policy requires a decrease
in the nominal interest rate following a positive productivity shock and an in-
crease in the nominal interest rate following a positive reservation wage shock.
The response of the nominal interests rate to both shocks decreases as the frac-
tion of walrasian rms q increases.
Equations (75) and (77) can also be rewritten in terms of standard devia-
tions, which allows us to derive the output-gap ination volatility frontier. Since
by assumption both shocks are iid. and therefore aw = 0; we can express the
volatility of ination and the volatility of the output gap as a function of the
volatility of the technology and reservation wage shocks. In particular we have:
 =

a

  a

a +

a

  w

w (80)
and
x =

a
 (
  a)

a +


 (
  a)

w: (81)
Notice that, as q  ! 1 then   (1 q)(1 )+q = 0 and therefore x =  = 0:
When instead q  ! 0; then  = (1 )+ and both x and  reach their
maximum possible values.
An interest rate rule that implements the optimal policy, can be found using
(78) and (76). In this case we obtain:
r^t =

1 +

1  w
w




Ett+1 +

1 +
(w   a)
w (1  a)
a

  a

r^nt : (82)
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In Appendix A6 we show that under rule (82) equilibrium is determinate. As-
suming, as a particular case a = w = ; equation (82) becomes
r^t =

1 +

1  





Ett+1 + r
n
t (83)
We can now state:
Result 4. Optimal monetary policy under discretion requires a more than
proportional increase in the nominal interest rate following an increase in the
expected rate of ination. However, an increase in the rate of interest supporting
the e¢ cient equilibrium implies a proportional increase in the nominal interest
rate if and only if a = w = 1. Otherwise an increase in r
e
t implies a more
than proportional increase in the nominal interest rate if w > a and a less
than proportional increase if w < a:
Also in our model therefore, as in the standard DNK model, optimality
requires that the Central Bank respond to increasing inationary expectations
by raising nominal interest rates more than proportionally. In other words,
also in a dualistic economy where part of the labor market is unionized, the
Taylor principle applies. The optimal response of the nominal interest rate to
an increase in the e¢ cient rate of interest, instead, is di¤erent from the one
that is usually obtained in the standardDSGE New Keynesian model. When
wages are set only in a perfectly competitive labor market, an increase in the
rate of interest supporting the e¢ cient equilibrium a¤ects only the IS curve,
and this implies that when the e¢ cient rate of interest increases, the nominal
interest rate must be raised by the same amount. When wages are also set
by monopoly unions, instead, the e¢ cient rate of interest, which is basically
determined by the productivity parameter that characterizes the economy, also
a¤ects directly the Phillips curve. This extra e¤ect on the Phillips curve requires
a further response bt the central bank. Observing (82) we can easily see that
Result 5. An increase in the fraction of walrasian rms does not a¤ect
the response of the nominal interest rate to expected ination but a¤ects the
response of the nominal interest rate to its e¢ cient level.
While the ratio between walrasian and unionized rms is crucial in deter-
mining the e¤ect of technology and cost-push shocks on ination, it does not
a¤ect the amount by which the interest rate must be raised in response to a unit
increase in expected ination. In other words, the extent of real wage rigidity in
the economy does not a¤ect the response coe¢ cient to expected ination. Two
economies hit by the same shocks but with a di¤erent q will experience di¤erent
movements in the nominal interest rate not because the central bank responds
di¤erently, but because the impact of the economy to the shocks is di¤erent.
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Log linearizing the demand for labor (23) in both sectors, we have that, for
w = u; h,
wht = mc
h
t + y
h
t  
1

yht +
1

at: (84)
Since the aggregate wage is given by the weighted sum of wages in the two
sectors, it can be expressed as:
wt = qmc
w
t + (1  q)mcut  
1  

yt +
1

at
Given(49), (48), (51) and (52), we obtain
wt = xt   (  1) at +wrt
which, given (62), becomes
wt =  

ut   (  1) at +wrt :
Notice that (63) and (62) together imply
ut =  

(1  a)
(
  a)
+ 1

at + 

(1  w)
(
  w)
+ 1

wrt : (85)
then we can rewrite the aggregate real wage as
wt = 

(1  a)
(
  a)
+ 1

at 

(1  w)
(
  w)
+ 1

wrt +  (  1) at+wrt
Notice that,
u =



(1  a)
(
  a)
+ 1

a
w =



(1  a)
(
  a)
+ 1

a
which implies
u   w =

(   ) (1  a)
(
  a)
+ (  )

a:
We can therefore state
Result 6. If ( ) (1 a)(
 a)+( ) > 0; under an optimal discretionary
policy and in response to a productivity shock, unemployment is more volatile
than the real wage. If ( ) > 0 the di¤erence between unemployment volatiliy
and real wage volatility decreases as the number of walrasian rms increases.
As we will show in the following section, for very plausible parameter val-
ues, we always have u   w > 0 which implies that, in general, our model is
consistent with a well known fact in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth
behavior of wages along the business cycle together with the relatively volatile
behavior of unemployment.
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3.2 Constrained Commitment
Let us assume that the Central Bank follows a rule for the target variable xt
which depends on the fundamental shocks wrt and r
n
t : In order to obtaine an
analytical solution we assume the following feedback rule equation
xct =  ! (at   wrt ) 8t (86)
and we also assume
a = w =  (87)
where ! > 0 is the coe¢ cient of the feedback rule and the variable xct is the
value of xt conditional on commitment to the policy.
Before solving the Central Bank problem under constrained commitment,
we iterate forward the Phillips curve (63) and we obtain:
ct =
!

 
 a
1   (at   w
r
t ) (88)
which, considering equation (86), can be rewritten as:
ct =  
a

1
1  x
c
t  
a
1   (at   w
r
t ) (89)
Notice that, in this case, a one percent contraction of xct reduces 
c
t by
the amount a
1
1  ; while under discretion, reducing xt by one percent only
produces a fall in t of a <
a

1
1  : As in the case analyzed by Clarida, Galì
and Gertler [8], the Central bank will enjoy an improved trade o¤, due to the
fact that commitment to a policy rule a¤ects expectations on the future course
of the output gap.
Given (86) and (88) we can now write the problem of the Central Bank
under constrained commitment as follows:
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY;t
2

(ct)
2
+
a

(xct)
2

Et
1X
i=0

wt+i   at+i
wrt   at
2
(90)
subject to equation (89). The rst order conditions imply:
xct =  


1
1  
c
t (91)
Since 
1
1  <

 this implies that commitment to a rule makes it optimal,
for the central bank, to induce a greater contraction of output in response to
an increase in ination. Substituting (91) into the Phillips curve and iterating
forward we obtain:
t =   a

c (1  ) (at   w
r
t ) (92)
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and
Ett+1 =   a

c (1  ) (at   w
r
t ) (93)
where 
c = 1 + 

1

1
1 
2
 > 
: The interest rate rule can be obtained by
substituting (91), (92) and (93) into the IS curve (67), in which case we obtain:
rct =  

1 +

1  


1



1  

a

c (1  )

+  (1  )

at+
+

1 +

1  


1



1  

a

c (1  )

wrt (94)
Using equation (91), the one of the Phillips curve and the one of the IS-curve
we nd the following optimal instrument rule:
r^ct =

1 +

1  


1


1  

Ett+1 + r^
n
t : (95)
Since 11  > 1, we have the following
Result 7. Under commitment to a simple feedback rule, when a = w =
; an optimal interest rule requires that the nominal interest rate increases in
response to a technology shock and decreases in response to a reservation wage
shock. The response of the interest rate to these shocks decreases as q increases.
If we instead consider the optimal instrument rule, in reacting to an increase
in expected ination the nominal interest rate must be increased more than in
the case of discretion, but the size of the reaction is again independent of the
relative proportion of walrasian rms.
3.3 Conclusions
We have considered in this paper a DSGE New Keynesian model where labor is
indivisible and where there are, at the same time, two types of labor markets:
one where wages are set competitively and one where wages are the result of the
bargaining between rms and monopoly unions. We found that, with respect to
the standard DNK framework, our model gives a more satisfactory description
of the reality of modern industrialized economies, since it is able to account for
the existence of signicant trade-o¤s between stabilizing ination and stabilizing
unemployment, in response to technology and exogenous wage shocks. Because
of real wage rigidity which is induced by the presence of unions, an optimizing
central bank must respond to negative (positive) technology shocks by increasing
(decreasing) the interest rate and, similarly, must respond to exogenous increases
in unionsreservation wage with an interest rate increase.
The e¤ect of these shocks on ination and the necessary interest rate move-
ments set by an optimizing central bank depend on the size of the walrasian
sector relative to the unionized sector. If a large part of wages are set in a
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competititve market, technology and cost-push shocks will have little e¤ect on
ination and will induce small interest rate movements, while an economy where
large part of wages are set in unionized markets will experience larger ination
and interest rate movements. If we consider however an optimal instrument rule
where the central bank reacts to expected ination, the response of the nom-
inal interest rate to an increase in expected ination is not inuenced by the
dualistic structure of the labor market. The model is also capable of accounting
for the greater volatility of unemployment relative to the wage volatility that is
usually found in the data.
Even though, for the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on a rigid dualistic
structure of the labor market and we abstract from other market imperfections
like search and matching costs, and we provide therefore a rather crude repre-
sentation of the labor market, we are able to single out, with this model, some of
the challenges provided to monetary policy by di¤erent institutional settings in
the labor market. The model, in particular, captures some important di¤erences
between the European and the U.S. economies and can represent, therefore, a
useful benchmark to evaluate and compare the monetary policies enacted by
the Fed and the ECB.
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